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OPERATING ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE IN NON-MUSLIM 
JURISDICTIONS: TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC PRECEPTS AND 
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
MUSTAFA R. K. BAIG*
Fulfill your pledge, indeed the pledge will be asked of. 
(Qur’an: 17:34) 
When a noble person makes a promise, he honors it. 
(Arabic/Sufi proverb attributed to ‘Al  Ibn Ab lib) 
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Oklahoma voters supported a ballot measure banning state 
courts from considering Islamic law or “Shari‘a”. The Tenth Circuit subse-
quently struck down the ban on the grounds that part of the ban singled out 
Islamic law for special restriction and because lawmakers failed to identify 
any instances where Islamic law caused an actual problem that the amend-
ment sought to solve, and violated Muslims’ constitutional right to freedom 
of religion.1 The “anti-Shari‘a movement,” however, gained ground in a 
number of states by modifying the language into more legally acceptable 
terms which prohibited courts from using foreign and international laws 
more generally (with some specific exceptions). 
Critics of the bills across the United States maintained that the revised 
wording in the state bills simply provided a more nuanced cover for the 
pre-existing motivation to stoke Islamophobic sentiments and stir anti-
Muslim prejudice. Some Republicans raised alarmist fears, such as Rick 
Santorum’s comment that “terrorism is a tactic, not an ideology. But this 
new existential threat to America, [Shari‘a] and its violent iteration ji-
hadism, has yet to be adequately explained by our leaders”2 and Newt Gin-
* Dr. Mustafa Baig is Research Fellow at the University of Exeter’s Institute of Arab and Islamic 
Studies.
 1.  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 2.  Pierre Tristam, The Anti-Sharia Law Movement in the United States, ABOUT.COM,
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grich’s comment that “Shari‘a is a mortal threat to the survival of freedom 
in the United States and in the world as we know it.”3
Such alarmist fear mongering present in the narrative—whether delib-
erate or made out of ignorance—mischaracterizes Shari‘a, both in regards 
to the topic under contention and the essence of Shari‘a more broadly.4
These reductionist attitudes reflect complete disregard for the moral and 
philosophical underpinnings and ethical considerations of the Shari‘a.5 The 
linguistic meaning of Shari‘a (“pathway” or “path to a water hole”) serves 
as a metaphor for its technical usage: just as water is essential for the vitali-
ty of human life, so is the Shari‘a for wayfarers traversing the journey of 
life in this world. Muslims attempt to discover the dictates of Shari‘a (the 
divine will of how they should live out their lives) through deep jurispru-
dential comprehension known as fiqh.6 Some aspects of this jurisprudence 
have been singled out in these controversies, and it is one such aspect—the 
Islamic jurisprudence concerning Muslims living in non-Muslim lands—
which will be the focus of this paper. In addition, part of the impetus driv-
ing the analysis is the absence of any informed discussion among politi-
cians and anti-Shari‘a campaigners about what the Islamic legal tradition 
actually says on the topic.7
 3.  Abed Awad, The True Story of Shari’a in American Courts, THE NATION (July 2, 2012), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/168378/true-story-Shari’a-american-courts#. 
 4.  For some underpinning points on power, discourse and narrative (and what could be argued as 
the historical roots of this narrative), see for example, Edward Said’s introduction to Orientalism.
EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 1–28 (Penguin Books 2003) (1979) (and related works). For a refined 
application of Said’s original thesis in a post-9/11 America, see HAMID DABASHI, POST-ORIENTALISM:
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN TIME OF TERROR (2009). There is a burgeoning number of studies on 
Orientalism and citizenship and interesting parallels can be drawn to the demonization of the Muslim 
citizen of the United States. See Engin F. Isin, Citizenship after Orientalism: Genealogical Investiga-
tions, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL THOUGHT: THEORIZING PRACTICES (Michael Freeden & Andrew 
Vincent eds., 2013); Engin F. Isin, Citizenship Without Nations, 30 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 
(2012) (for race being an important constitutive factor in constructions of citizenship).
 5.  To visit some of the recent academic expositions on this, see for example, Wael B. Hallaq, 
Groundwork of the Moral Law: A New Look at the Qur’ n and the Genesis of Shar ‘a, 16 ISLAMIC LAW 
& SOC’Y 239, 239–79 (2009). 
 6.  It is in this sense that I use the term Islamic law (or jurisprudence). For more discussions on 
Shari‘a, fiqh and other related matters, see the introduction of WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHAR ‘A: THEORY,
PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS (2009) and Norman Calder, Feqh, ENCYCLOPAEDIA IRANICA 504–11
(1999), available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/feqh#article-tags-overlay. Also useful is 
Robert Gleave’s introduction in NORMAN CALDER, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CLASSICAL ERA
(Colin Imber ed., 2010). 
 7.  For more on Islamophobia and the anti-Shari‘a movement in the United States, see Wajahat 
Ali et al., Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS,
(Aug. 26, 2011),  
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/religion/report/2011/08/26/10165/fear-inc/. There have been a 
number of responses and rebuttals to the anti-Shari‘a campaign in the United States from individuals 
and organizations (both Muslims and non-Muslims alike). For some shorter statements, see Alicia Gay, 
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In examining the Islamic jurisprudence of Muslims living under non-
Muslim rule, I will begin by looking at the rudimentary issue of how Mus-
lim jurists viewed the actuality of Muslim individuals living in non-Muslim 
jurisdictions. The ensuing question then, as discussed by jurists, is the rela-
tionship that a Muslim has to a Muslim polity, and the extent to which Is-
lamic laws can be jurisdictionally extended and applied (if it all) to 
Muslims living beyond the jurisdiction of Muslim territory (D r al-Isl m).
The third section addresses that question by looking at the guidance that 
Muslim jurists give to Muslims living in non-Muslim lands, in terms of 
how they should organize their own legal affairs independent from Muslim 
sovereignty. Particular attention is given to the appointment of Muslim 
judges in non-Muslim lands. 
For purposes of remaining within the natural constraints of the essay, 
and also to provide readers with the authoritative weight of the tradition, 
my focus is largely on the pre-modern Islamic legal tradition (specifically 
the Sunni tradition).8 Part of the concluding comments will outline the 
adaptability of the Islamic juristic tradition with the actual interaction of 
“Shari‘a” with the contemporary American legal system. 
I. MUSLIM MIGRATION (HIJRA) AND LIVING UNDER NON-MUSLIM
JURISDICTION
There are two main precedents from the Qur’an and Prophetic prac-
tice/Sunna (the two primary sources of Islamic law) relating to emigration. 
The first precedent concerns the persecution of the early followers of the 
Prophet, especially those of poorer classes. When the Prophet saw the af-
fliction of his Companions ( a ba) intensify, he said to them, “If you 
were to go to Abyssinia (it would be better for you), for the king will not 
tolerate injustice and it is a friendly country, until such time as Allah shall 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-religion-belief/aclu-lens-truth-behind-anti-sharia-
movement; Usha Nellore, The So-Called Anti-Sharia Law Movement: A Chilling Example of the Para-
noid Style in American Politics, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 28, 2011), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-08-28/news/bs-ed-sharia-law-20110828_1_anti-sharia-sharia-
law-paranoid-style; The Anti-Sharia Campaign, JEWS AGAINST ISLAMOPHOBIA,
http://www.jewsagainstislamophobia.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09//Anti-Sharia-campaign.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2014); Jesse Yurow, Anti-Sharia Legislation, JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/blog/national-anti-sharia-legislation (includes a number of useful links 
here); and Rabbis & Synagogues Standing against Islamophobia, JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE (Nov. 5,
2014), http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/blog/rabbis-synagogues-standing-against-islamophobia. There are 
similar “anti-Shari‘a” trends in Canada and some European countries, although anti-Shari‘a campaigns 
have not been as organized nor have they had the same impact in Europe. 
 8.  That is within the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, namely anaf , M lik , Sh fi‘  and 
anbal . Much of the focus will be on the anaf  School (the largest of the four) for reasons that will 
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relieve you from your distress.”9 Upon arrival, the Muslims engaged them-
selves in acts of worship and piety, living peacefully among their host 
community. After some time, news had spread that the Meccan population 
had converted to Islam. So some Companions of the Prophet returned to 
Mecca, only to find that the news was untrue. Some Companions returned 
again to Abyssinia, while others attempted and failed to conceal them-
selves. When they were found, they were persecuted and tortured more 
than before. Hence, the Prophet again ordered them to leave for Abyssin-
ia.10
In this first instance of migration, Muslims exercised self-exile in or-
der to avoid persecution. But the next migration to take place was of a dif-
ferent nature. It was not voluntary as it was in the previous case but 
obligatory, and the order to emigrate to Medina (known as Yathrib at the 
time) was not only for a few Muslims, but for almost the entire Muslim 
population of Mecca. A summarized description of the events is as follows: 
members of the Aws and Khazraj tribes of Medina (who, although idola-
ters, kept close company with the Jews of Medina) converted to Islam 
through visits to Medina where they heard verses of the Qur’an recited to 
them by the Prophet, and through an emissary sent to them from Mecca. 
The new Muslim community in Medina invited the Prophet there, taking an 
oath that they would protect him with their lives. As Medina established 
itself as a safe haven for Islam and Muslims, the Prophet permitted his 
Companions to migrate to Medina. Gradually, all migrated except those 
who were either imprisoned or did not have the financial means to do so. 
In the year 622 (26th day of the Islamic month of Safar), the Prophet 
left for Mecca. This event marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar and 
the obligation on all the Companions to emigrate.11 There are numerous 
verses in the Qur’an that discuss the hijra and extol the virtues of those that 
migrate(d).12 Although it is not a like-for-like precedent, as the migration 
 9. MUHAMMAD IBN IS Q, S RAT RAS L ALLAH 146 (A. Guillaume trans., Oxford University 
Press 2001). Negus (Arabic: al-Naj sh ), the king of Abyssinia was a devout Christian and a great 
scholar of the revealed scriptures. He was recognized for his justice and tolerance. A ama Ibn Abjar 
(his proper name) later converted to Islam and died in 9 AH.  
 10.  1 MUHAMMAD AL-ZARQ N , SHAR  AL-MAW HIB AL-LADUN YA BI’L-MINA  AL-
MU AMMAD YA 503–06 (1996) (Leb.); IBN IS Q, supra note 9, at 148. 
 11.  IBN IS Q, supra note 9, at 198. 
 12.  The one most frequently mentioned (known as the “hijra verse”) to determine the legal aspect 
of migration reads:  
Verily, those who are given death by the angels while they were wronging themselves, the 
angels say to them: In what [plight] were you in? They reply: We were oppressed in the land. 
They say: Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to emigrate? Such people will 
find their abode in Hell - what an evil refuge! Except the weak among men, women and chil-
dren who have no means in their power nor have guidance to a way [to the land of migration]. 
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that took place was from a non-Muslim land to another non-Muslim land 
(Mecca at the time being a non-Muslim land, as was Medina), jurists did, 
nevertheless, link the imperative to emigrate to Medina to the question of 
whether it was permissible to reside in non-Muslim lands, and it results 
from the fact that joining the Prophet in Medina meant the freedom to prac-
tice the Islamic faith without oppression. 
Before looking at these legal discussions, it is important to comment 
on where these discussions are located in the works of Islamic jurispru-
dence. The subject of Muslim relations with non-Muslims in classical legal 
literature is primarily discussed under the heading of siyar (expeditions). 
Muslim jurists defined the subject of siyar, not only as “ways” of conduct 
of the warriors and what is incumbent on them and for “them,” but also as 
governing relations with a wide spectrum of groups ranging from unbeliev-
ers and apostates to those with whom treaties have been made.13 Some 
writers, aiming to find an analogous term, have rendered siyar into English 
as Islamic international law or the Islamic law of nations.14
Sometimes, the terms siyar and jihad are grouped together to form a 
heading. The impression that Muslim/non-Muslim relations are confined to 
military struggle seems to be confirmed by both the content and titles of 
this section of jurisprudence. The section has subsections that largely cover 
aspects of warfare, imamate (leadership in war), taxation, treaties, spoils of 
war, rebels and apostasy. Perhaps the reason such headings dominate the 
kit b, or b b, is that the early contact between Muslims and non-Muslims 
was largely by virtue of warfare, actual or potential. Hence, Muslim jurists 
bifurcated the world into two realms: D r al-Islam (abode or territory of 
Islam) and D r al- arb (territory of war), reflecting the historical reality of 
the time. This feeds the impression that jurists only discussed jihad and the 
relationship with non-Muslims in reference to military struggles against the 
enemy. Although the term D r al- arb literally means “Abode of War,” it 
does not refer to a perpetual state of physical war, nor—as we shall see—
does it preclude the possibility of peaceful Muslim abidance in non-Muslim 
territory. Furthermore, non-Muslim territory was sometimes designated as 
d r al-muw da‘a, ul , hudna (muh dana) or ‘ahd if D r al-Islam had
igrates in the cause of Allah will find plenty and spacious refuge. And he who leaves his 
home emigrating toward Allah and His Messenger and death befalls him, then his reward is 
certain with Allah and Allah is most Forgiving and Merciful.  
Qur’an, 4:97–100 (translations of Qur’anic verses are my own). 
 13.  10 AB BAKR MUHAMMAD IBN A MAD AL-SARAKHS , KIT B AL-MABS  3 (n.d.) (Pak.). 
 14.  See for example MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI’S SIYAR
(1966) and the Arabic edition by the same author MAJID KHADDURI, AL-Q N N AL-DAWL  AL-ISL M :
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entered into a peace treaty or truce with D r al- arb.15 Muslim scholars 
viewed peace settlements as “jihad in meaning” because the purpose of 
jihad is to actualize peace and repel evil that result from continued hostili-
ties, and this is what “serves the interests of Muslims.”16
Nonetheless, Ab an fa (the eponym of the anaf  School, d. 
150/767) reportedly disapproved of Muslims residing in non-Muslim terri-
tories. Under the heading of “Muslims entering D r al- arb with a securi-
ty covenant (am n) for trade,” Ab an fa’s opinion is relayed when he is 
asked by his pupil about marriage with People of the Book:17
I asked: What is your opinion of a Muslim who enters non-Muslim terri-
tory under an am n and marries from among the inhabitants of that terri-
tory who is from the People of the Book? 
Ab an fa replied: I disapprove of his doing so. 
I asked: But if he marries, would such a marriage be valid? 
He replied: Yes. 
I asked: Then, why did you disapprove of it? 
He replied: Because I disapprove of his living in it.18
Muhammad al-Shayb n  (d. 189/805)—who is among two of Ab
an fa’s most widely cited students—gives his opinion in regards to a per-
son that converts to Islam in non-Muslim territory. He states that the duty 
to migrate to the land of Islam after conversion, according to the majority 
of scholars, was abrogated at the time of the Prophet in Medina. In support 
of that assertion, he cites the narration of the Prophet: “There is no migra-
tion [required] after the conquest of Mecca.”19
The renowned Transoxanian anaf  jurist and redactor of al-Shayb n ,
al-Sarakhs  (referred to as shams al-a’imma, or “sun of the leading schol-
 15.  Such an agreement and recognition by the Muslim land of these regions was sometimes in 
return for a tributary tax (jizya), exercising a type of suzerainty over them (although, according to 
prominent jurists, wealth should only be taken when the Muslims are in a state of need). The default 
position, however, was that they were D r al- arb (and these terms are often used in conjunction with 
and understood as derivatives of r al- arb). D r al-Kufr (abode of non-belief) and r al- arb are 
used interchangeably but sometimes D r al-Kufr is distinguished from D r al- arb as simply a land of 
non-Muslims as opposed to one hostile to Muslim lands (mu rib). See Qur’an, 8:56–61. Some modern 
Muslim reformers advocate the reconceptualizing of these categories to reflect their perception of the 
modern world order. Also see KHADDURI, supra note 14 (translator’s introduction); Mohammed Fadel, 
History of Islamic International Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. (2010), available
at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Fadel/Max_Planck_Final.pdf. 
 16.  2 BURH N AL-D N AB  AL- ASAN ‘AL  AL-MARGH N N , AL-HID YA SHAR BID YAT AL-
MUBTAD  138-139 (n.d.) (Egypt).  
 17. People of the Book (Ahl al-Kit b) refers to Jews and Christians (or those that have belief in 
divine scripture). 
 18.  MUHAMMAD IBN AL- ASAN AL-SHAYB N , AL-QAN N AL-DAWL  AL-ISL M : KIT B AL-
SIYAR LI’L-SHAYB N  191 (M. Khadduri ed., 1975).  
 19.  Mentioned in a number of places in all major collections under the chapters of Pilgrimage, 
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ars” (d. 499/1106)), commenting al-Shayb n ’s opinion, stated that the 
migration was obligated in the Qur’anic verse (cited above) because the 
Muslims were living under oppression and the obligation would continue to 
the Day of Judgment if such a cause (sabab) is found. On the other hand, if 
such a sabab is not found, and Muslims can live honorably, then the obliga-
tion to migrate is lifted. Hence, the majority of scholars conceived hijra as 
ending with the conquest of Mecca in accordance to the Hadith20—that
“there is no hijra after the conquest.”21 Similarly, the great Egyptian tradi-
tionalist and jurist, Badr al-D n al-‘Ayn  (d. 855/1453), commenting on the 
Hadith, mentions that Muslims fled with their religion towards Allah and 
His Messenger for fear of enticement away from Islam, and in his time 
(already), he noted, Muslims are able to worship their Lord wherever they 
desire.22 As well as the Prophetic narration, the anaf  jurists looked at the 
operative cause (illa) in the obligation to migrate away from non-Muslim 
lands. Although Ab an fa’s opinion does not contradict that of his fol-
lowers, if one did attempt to reconcile any apparent difference, one could 
argue that Ab an fa’s opinion considered the question of Muslims resid-
ing in non-Muslim lands with the operative cause in place. Later scholars 
clarified and elaborated his view by mentioning that if Muslims did not 
find themselves being oppressed or persecuted, then they could remain in 
non-Muslim territory. 
One should also bear in mind that Ab an fa merely disapproved of 
Muslims living in non-Muslim lands—he did not forbid it. Other scholars 
elaborated on the implicit concern in Ab an fa’s statement as to whether 
or not it was possible for Muslims living in non-Muslim lands to carry out 
their religious duties. Moreover, this conceptual continuity was expressed 
by the late anaf  scholar (and exegete) from India, Na‘ m al-D n
Mur d b d  (d. 1948/1367), as he commented on the verse of obligation 
that “if a Muslim is residing in a land where he is unable to perform his 
religious obligations (far ’i ), and is aware of a land where he can practice 
his faith, then it is obligatory (w jib) that he performs migration to that 
land.”23 The important condition of having knowledge of a land where he 
can practice his faith without difficulty is added. 
 20.  Transmitted reports of Prophetic practice/sayings (Sunna).
 21.  1 MUHAMMAD IBN A MAD AB BAKR AL-SARAKHS , SHAR  AL-SIYAR AL-KAB R 271–72 
(1958); 10 AL-SARAKHS , supra note 13, at 8–9. 
 22.  15 BADR AL-D N AB MUHAMMAD MA M D IBN A MAD AL-‘AYN , ‘UMDAT AL-Q R
SHAR A  AL-BUKH R  18 (2003) (Leb.). 
 23.  NA‘ M AL-D N AL-MUR D B D , KHAZ ’IN AL-‘IRF N F TAFS R AL-QUR’ N 4:97 123 (n.d.) 
(Pak.) (known as shiya Kanz al- m n, a marginalia on A mad Ri  (Raz ) Kh n al-Bar lw  al-
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The Sh fi‘  School seems to be unified in their position. Muhammad 
Ibn Idr s al-Sh fi‘  (d. 204/820) argued that, even after the establishment of 
the Islamic rule in Medina, ‘Abdull h Ibn ‘Abb s and other Companions 
were allowed to reside in Mecca (then a non-Muslim territory). Additional-
ly, the Prophet allowed nomadic tribes that converted to Islam to remain 
outside the domains of the lands of Islam. The Prophet, according to al-
Sh fi‘ , would not have given these people a choice of residence if it were 
sinful for them to retain their independence. Consequently, Muslims who 
convert in non-Muslim lands may reside there unless they fear enticement 
away from Islam.24
Other Hadith narrations indicate that the Prophet forbade Muslims 
from living with non-Muslims. Ab  D w d, in his Sunan relates,
“[W]hoever joins a polytheist and lives with him is like him.”25 The narra-
tion could refer to Muslims residing in the dwellings of non-Muslims (as 
the pronouns used are all in the singular), but Ab  D w d’s placing of the 
narration under the heading “living in the lands of shirk” rules this out, at 
least according to him. A similar narration is mentioned by al-Tirmidh
(with plural pronouns) under the heading of “the disapproval [kar h ya] of 
residing among polytheists.”26 Under the same heading, another report 
states, “I disavow myself of every Muslim who settles among the polythe-
ists.”27
There does seem to be some difference of opinion among the scholars 
in how these narrations should be interpreted. For example, Al-Kha b  (d. 
388/988), an early Hadith commentator, reconciled the differences of opin-
ion by arguing that hijra was actually meant to support and strengthen the 
D r al-Isl m in its nascent days. After the conquests, D r al-Isl m was so 
strong and established that migration was no longer required. The hijra
would only be required again when the conditions so demanded.28 Ibn 
ajar al-‘Asqal n  (d. 852/1448)—among the foremost Hadith commenta-
tors and a jurist of the Sh fi‘  school—analyzed the legality of Muslims 
 24.  4 AB ‘ABDULL H MUHAMMAD IBN IDR S AL-SH FI‘ , AL-UMM 161 (Leb.); K. Abou El 
Fadl, Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities, in 1 ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 146–47 (Brill & Leiden 
1994). 
 25.  3 AB D W D SULAYM N IBN AL-ASH‘ATH, SUNAN 93 (n.d.) (Hadith report 2787). 
 26.  3 AB ‘ S MUHAMMAD IBN ‘ S  AL-TIRMIDH , AL-J MI‘ 80–81 (1980) (Leb.) (Hadith report 
1655). See also 2 AB ‘ABDULL H AL- KIM AL-N SH P R , AL-MUSTADRAK 154 (2002) (Leb.) 
(Hadith report 2627). 
 27.  3 AL-TIRMIDH , supra note 26, at 80 (Hadith report 1654); see also 3 IBN AL-ASH‘ATH, supra
note 25 (Hadith report 2645). 
 28.  See Muhammad Khalid Masud, The Obligation to Migrate: The Doctrine of ‘Hijra’ in Islamic 
Law, in MUSLIM TRAVELLERS, PILGRIMAGE, MIGRATION AND THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION 33 (Dale 
Eickelman and James Piscatori eds., Univ. of California Press 1990) (citing 6 IBN AJAR AL-
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residing in a non-Muslim land and discussed conditions that would permit 
them to reside there. He stated: (i) if a Muslim has the means to emigrate 
from non-Muslim lands, and it is not possible for him to manifest his faith 
nor can he perform his obligatory duties, then emigration from there is 
obligatory upon him; (ii) if he has the means to emigrate but it is possible 
for him to manifest his faith and perform his obligatory duties then it is 
preferable to emigrate so that he may strengthen and assist the Muslims, 
engage in jihad, and that he is secure from their deception and is at peace 
from seeing evil (munkar); (iii) he is unable to emigrate due to captivity or 
illness, for example, then he is permitted to reside there.29
The anbal  scholar, Muwaffaq al-D n Ibn Qud ma (d. 620/1223), 
classifies the ruling on emigration into the same three categories. Again, he 
refers to the hijra verse cited above.30
In looking at the Qur’anic verses, the Prophetic narrations, and the 
analyses of the jurists/Hadith scholars, the concept of hijra was understood 
to be linked to the freedom of worship and to strengthening the new Mus-
lim community. The migration of the Prophet and his Companions took 
place to a land where Muslims could practice their religious rites unreserv-
edly and from a land where they were persecuted for doing so. The juristic 
schools do not differ to any great extent with respect to this issue. In fact, 
the approach of the anaf s, Sh fi‘ s and anbal s is near identical. In 
terms of permanent residence in non-Muslim lands, the Sh fi‘  and anbal
view, that migration to Muslim lands is preferable, can be analogized with 
Ab an fa’s view of disfavoring residence. 
The M lik  School, on the other hand, differed considerably with their 
counterparts. M lik Ibn Anas (d. 179/795) strongly disapproved of Mus-
lims even traveling to non-Islamic territory for purposes of trade, let alone 
for permanent residence. When one of M lik’s students, Ibn al-Q sim (d. 
191/806), was asked by ‘Abd al-Sal m Sa n n (d. 240/855) whether M lik 
disapproved of merchants traveling to non-Muslim territory for the purpose 
of conducting business, Ibn al-Q sim responded, “Yes, M lik would disap-
prove of it strongly [kar h ya shad da], and he used to say, ‘they should 
not go to their lands where they will become subject to the laws of polythe-
 29.  6 A MAD IBN ‘AL IBN AJAR AL-‘ASQAL N , FAT  AL-B R SHAR A  AL-BUKH R
209–10 (n.d.) (Egypt).  
 30.  Qur’an, supra note 12; 8 MUWAFFAQ AL-D N ‘ABDULL H IBN MUHAMMAD IBN QUD MA,
AL-MUGHN  456–58 (1948) (Egypt). Ibn ajar’s discussion (supra note 29) appears as a shortened (and 
slightly modified) version of Ibn Qud ma’s text. It may well be that Ibn Qud ma has embraced this 
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ism [a k m al-shirk].’”31 M lik’s view is the strictest, and seems to defy 
the social and historical practice of Muslim traders who, at the time, were 
traveling to non-Muslim lands in large numbers. As well as his concern for 
Muslims being subject to non-Muslim law in general, he is concerned more 
specifically with financial transactions being governed by non-Muslim 
rules (considering he is being asked about traders). Later M lik  scholars, 
such as the Andalusian Ibn Rushd (d. 520/1126) and the North African al-
Wanshar s  (d. 914/1508), continued to propagate the same position, albeit 
with some scholars taking limited exceptions.32
II. MUSLIMS ENTERING D R AL-HARB UNDER A SECURITY COVENANT
(AM N) FOR TRADE
Addressing Muslims in foreign lands as merchants was a particularly 
pertinent consideration for Muslim jurists, as trading was an important 
feature of Arab society even before the advent of Islam. Arab trade in the 
Malabar region of coastal India, South East Asia and East Asia is well-
documented,33 and those travels continued throughout the era of the Proph-
et and the early caliphate.34 As such, trade naturally played an important 
 31.  10 ‘ABD AL-SAL M IBN SA‘ D SA N N, AL-MUDAWWANA AL-KUBR  102 (1905) (Egypt). 
The fact that it is the opening passage in the chapter on “Travelling to the Enemy’s Land for Trade” is 
instructive of his attitude toward Muslims traveling to non-Muslims lands. 
 32.  MUHAMMAD IBN A MAD IBN RUSHD, KIT B AL-MUQADDIM T AL-MUMAHHID T 611–12 
(1970) (Iraq); 2 A MAD IBN YA Y  AL-WANSHAR S , AL-MI‘Y R AL-MU‘RIB 119–38 (1981) (Moroc-
co). Also see 1 IBN ‘ABD AL-BARR AL-QUR UB , KIT B AL-K F  F FIQH AHL AL-MAD NA AL-M LIK ,
370 (1980) (Saudi Arabia). There is some flexibility in the view of Ab  Bakr Ibn al-‘Arab  (d. 
543/1148). Some of these positions were, in part, driven by political circumstances on the ground. I 
intend to take up the views of M lik  scholars in a future article.  
 33.  Hermanus J. de Graff, South-East Asian Islam to the Eighteenth Century, in 2A THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM 123 (P. M. Holt, A. K. S. Lambton & B. Lewis eds., 1984); IRA
LAPIDUS, A HISTORY OF MUSLIM SOCIETIES 383 (2002); JONATHAN N. LIPMAN, FAMILIAR 
STRANGERS: A HISTORY OF MUSLIMS IN NORTHWEST CHINA 24–31 (1997). Muslim merchants and 
political emissaries travelled as far as China during and after the caliphate of ‘Uthm n Ibn ‘Aff n
(24/644-35/656). Popular stories that the venerated Companion Sa‘d Ibn Ab  Waqq s (with some 
Companions) sailed to China from Abyssinia (whist in asylum) in 616 and later again leading an envoy 
in 650 (or other varying dates) are not corroborated by Muslim sources or Western historians. Similar 
can be said of the story of a supposed Companion named M lik Ibn D n r entering Kerala in India and 
converting the king to Islam. M lik Ibn D n r is actually a name of a person from the third generation 
of Muslims renowned for his knowledge and asceticism. Nevertheless, while the details surrounding 
M lik Ibn D n r may be mythical, the conversion of an Indian king from that region has been linked to 
a Hadith (of questionable authenticity) in which the king gifted a jar of ginger pickle to the Prophet. 4 
AL- KIM, supra note 26 at 150 (Hadith report 7190). There is also mention in some biographical 
works of the Prophet (s ra). 
 34.  Not to mention that the Prophet himself went on trade journeys before declaring his 
prophethood and married the successful merchant Khad ja who he married after successfully and hon-
estly trading on her behalf. In one tradition, for example, the Prophet is reported to have said: “[The 
status of the] truthful, trustworthy merchant is among the Prophets, the truthful, and the martyrs.” 2 AL-
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role in the propagation of Islam outside the Arabian Peninsula.35 Thus, it is 
understandable why the earliest Islamic jurists addressed Muslim traders in 
non-Muslim lands. This socio-economic phenomenon required legal rules 
to deal with the various particulars, even if that entailed devising hypothet-
ical (albeit, purposeful) scenarios comparable to the discourse adopted in 
other areas within jurisprudence. No independent heading was usually des-
ignated for the Muslim trader in legal texts.36 Nevertheless, Muslim traders 
are mentioned in the discussion of isti’m n (claiming a security covenant), 
under the section of siyar (jihad), referring to a situation where a Muslim 
enters non-Muslim lands with a security covenant. This shows that one 
could in fact enter D r al- arb in a peaceful state. Therefore, one cannot 
exclusively ascribe the connotation of war or belligerence to D r al- arb.
 The issue of Muslims entering non-Muslim lands for trade purposes 
is addressed in a renowned standard text (matn) of the anaf  School, al-
Mukhta ar li’l-Qud r , which summarizes the authoritative legal views of 
the School. It states the following: “If a Muslim enters D r al- arb as a 
trader, it is not permitted for him to infringe on their property and life.”37 In 
their commentaries on this statement, Burh n al-D n al-Margh n n  (d. 
593/1197) and Ab  Bakr al-Yam n  (d. 800/1397) explain that this is be-
cause a Muslim is duty-bound to abide by the security covenant; any in-
fringement after obtaining it is a violation of the law (ghadar), and 
violation of the law is forbidden (haram).38 This is contrary to a prisoner of 
war, even one that is freed willingly, as he is not under a security covenant. 
Al-Margh n n  also adds that, if the contract is contravened by the non-
Muslim sovereign or by the consent of the sovereign, then he is no longer 
responsible for upholding the covenant.39
In sum, Muslim jurists prohibited any kind of deceit in financial deal-
ings or breaking of local law in D r al- arb. Such rulings dismiss the no-
tion that Islam only permits hostile relations to exist between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. Upon the obtaining of a security covenant (and paying mutu-
words (Truthful and Trustworthy were two honorific titles the Prophet himself earned before declaring 
Prophethood due to his dealings with the Arabs and conduct in trade). 
 35.  See, e.g., 2 MAURICE LOMBARD, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ISLAM (Joan Spencer trans., North-
Holland Medieval Translations 1975) (providing more information on trade in early Islam). 
 36.  There are exceptions such as al-Mudawwana cited above. 3 IBN SA‘ D SA N N, supra note 
31. This may seem somewhat ironic given the M lik  attitude toward Muslims trading in non-Muslim 
lands.
 37.  AB  AL- ASAN A MAD IBN MUHAMMAD AL-BAGHD D  AL-QUD R , AL-MUKHTA AR LI’L-
QUD R  296 (n.d.) (Pak.). 
 38. 2 AB BAKR IBN ‘AL  AL- ADD D AL-YAM N , AL-JAWHARAT AL-NAYYIRA ‘AL
MUKHTASAR AL-QUDURI 373 (n.d.) (Pak.); 2 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 152. 





      01/14/2015   15:25:42
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 52 Side B      01/14/2015   15:25:42
P04 - BAIG (WITH SIGNIFICANT CHANGES)(4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2015 9:32 AM
90 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
al observance to it), Islamic law does not allow a person to break any part 
of the law, let alone attack the property and persons living there. 
It is interesting to note that al-Margh n n  and other jurists allocate a 
separate subheading (b b) for the musta’min (he who claims a security 
covenant) within the Kit b al-Siyar/Jih d. This indicates that the jurists 
distinguished between the ways to enter non-Muslim lands (D r al- arb):
one way was through military expeditions, and the other was through 
peaceful means such as trade. Both types are discussed under siyar/jihad.40
Later scholars have added other generic means of entry into the Abode of 
War, over and above trade, without specifying what these might be. For 
example, al-Mayd n , in his gloss on the al-Qud r text above, stated that, 
“[I]f a Muslim enters D r al- arb by way of trade (or other means) it is 
not permitted for him to infringe on their property and life.”41 This suggests 
that al-Qud r  was not intending to limit purposes of travel to trade only, 
or, from a legal-historical point of view, it perhaps indicates and acknowl-
edges a diversification in reasons why Muslims were traveling to non-
Muslim lands. In other words, “trade” is not a precluding qualification 
(qayd i tir z ) but an incidental one (qayd ittif q /w qi‘ ).
The obligation to uphold the security covenant is expressly mentioned 
by al-M ward  (d. 448/972), who states that, “[a] Muslim who enters D r
al- arb with a security covenant or is taken captive but then freed and 
given a security covenant is not permitted to attack them or their property, 
and has to guarantee them quarter.”42 Al-M ward  states this without men-
tioning any difference among the four schools of law, pointing towards 
unanimity among the established schools on this issue.43 It is worth men-
tioning here that, in contrast to the anaf  texts, M lik  texts after al-
Mudawwana appear to devote less attention to the case of a person claim-
ing a security covenant or a Muslim trader in non-Muslim lands. This is 
probably because the M lik  School was much more reluctant to permit 
Muslims to travel to non-Muslim lands in the first place.44 However, the 
agreement of the jurists, if such a contract is made, still stands. 
 40.  The inverse case of a non-Muslim musta’min entering Muslim territory is also discussed 
under this section, again signifying the provision in the law of a means of peaceful existence between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. 
 41.  4 ‘ABD AL-GHAN  AL-MAYD N , AL-LUB B F SHAR  AL-KIT B 134–35 (n.d.) (Leb.). The 
words in parentheses are Mayd n ’s own words. 
 42.  AB  AL- ASAN ‘AL IBN MUHAMMAD AL-M WARD , AL-A K M AL-SUL N YA 141 (1973) 
(Egypt). 
 43.  Id. Al-M ward  (a Sh fi‘  jurist), in his book on the regulations of governance, mentions 
difference of opinion among the jurists if any exists. Here he only mentions D w d (founder of the 
minority, now extinct, hir  School) as the only person to differ. 
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III. THE JURISDICTION OF D R AL-ISL M (THE ABODE OF ISLAM) IN 
NON-MUSLIM TERRITORY
Given the obligation to abide by the security covenant, the jurists then 
had to address what type of law should apply if a Muslim contravened the 
law of the land. Essentially, this is a type of choice-of-law question. And in 
Islamic law, it involved defining the extent of D r al-Isl m’s territorial 
jurisdiction. The anaf s hold that Muslim jurisdiction cannot extend to 
non-Muslim territory. Ab an fa is reported to have responded to the 
question of crimes committed in non-Muslim territory and which system of 
punishment is applicable in the following conversation: 
I said: What is your opinion about this, that someone who goes in 
amongst them [in D r al- arb] with a security covenant, and if then 
kills one of their men in D r al- arb, or seizes property or a slave and 
takes it to D r al-Isl m, then the inhabitants of [D r al-] Harb convert to 
Islam or become a Protected Community [dhimma],45 would you return 
to them any of what this [person] took, or is there any liability for any of 
[the victim’s] wealth or blood? 
He said: No. 
I said: Why? 
He said: Because he carried out this act in D r al- arb, where rules for 
Muslims are not applicable. 
I said: Would you disapprove of this [action] of the man? 
He said: Yes—I would disapprove of it for him on the grounds of his re-
ligion to act perfidiously towards them.46
Behind this discussion lies a larger concept of the inviolability and 
protection of life and property. The anaf  jurists discussed the issue of a 
Muslim in non-Muslim lands who loans money or property (on credit) to a 
non-Muslim or is loaned something by a non-Muslim. If the two return to 
D r al-Isl m, and one of them files a suit against the other in an Islamic 
court, then the Islamic sovereign ( kim or q ) will not decree anything 
in this regard. The same applies if one embezzles the property of the other 
(gha b).47 The jurists maintain that wil ya, or jurisdiction, is a requisite for 
 45.  Ahl al-Dhimma are non-Muslim subjects of D r al-Isl m whose safety and protection is the 
responsibility of the sovereign in return for paying jizya (tributary tax).  
 46.  AL-SHAYB N , supra note 18, at 194. 
 47.  2 AL-MARGH N N , BID YAT AL-MUBTAD  153 (n.d.) (Egypt) (printed with its commentary 
al-Hid ya by the same author supra note 16. Although al-Hid ya is a commentary on his own work, 
Bid yat al-Mubtad , it is practically a commentary on al-Qud r ’s Mukhta ar (Epitome) but with a 
limited number of changes and additions to the original included from al-J mi‘ al-Sagh r of al-
Shayb n  (or from elsewhere if necessary). See MUHAMMAD ‘ABD AL- AYY AL-LAKHNAW , AL-
FAW ’ID AL-BAH YA F TAR JIM AL- ANAF YA 140 (Leb.) (although I have added some observations 
of my own here). Interestingly, this passage is not found in al-Qud r ’s text but al-Margh n n  has 
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the enforcement of a decree.48 In this case, the judge did not have jurisdic-
tion at the time the debt took place (l  wil yata waqt al-idd na a lan)49 as 
the q is not able to adjudicate on those who are in D r al- arb.50 The 
jurists also add that, at the time of adjudication (qa ’), the judge does not 
hold jurisdiction over the non-Muslim since the individual had not commit-
ted himself to the jurisdiction of Islam in the past (ma ), when the act had 
been carried out, but rather had committed himself to what will take place 
in the future (mustaqbal).51 Nevertheless, the q will issue a fatwa to the 
Muslim, stating that the property owed or embezzled should be returned; 
this is not a legally binding decree that will enforce the return of property 
but rather a verdict that states his religious obligation to abide by the 
am n.52 Kam l al-D n Ibn al-Hum m (d. 861/1457) adds that although the 
state will not enforce the return of the property, the fatwa will state that it is 
obligatory (w jib) to return it, as the matter remains between him and 
God.53 Here, we see the difference between a legal obligation (in terms of a 
state injunction) and a religious and moral obligation to return the property. 
On the issue of owed property, the same ruling is given if two non-
Muslims from non-Muslim territory file a case in D r al-Isl m. This is due 
IBN A MAD IBN MA M D AL-NASAF , KANZ AL-DAQ ’IQ 593–94 (2004) (Pak.); 6 MUHAMMAD IBN 
‘ABDULL H AL-TAMART SH , TANW R AL-AB R 276 (2003) (Leb.) (printed with its commentary 6
MUHAMMAD ‘AL  AL-D N AL- ASKAF , DURR AL-MUKHT R SHAR TANW R AL-AB R (2003) (Leb.) 
and supercommentary 6 SAYYID MUHAMMAD AM N IBN ‘ BID N, RADD AL-MU T R ‘AL DURR AL-
MUKHT R SHAR TANW R AL-AB R (2003) (Leb.) (al-Qud r ’s Mukhta ar and al-Nasaf ’s Kanz al-
Daq ’iq are counted among the four key foundational primers (mut n) of the anaf  School. Tanw r al-
Ab r occupies a parallel position to them, incorporating issues addressed by later scholars); 2 SHAYKH 
NI AM ET AL., AL-FAT W  AL-HIND YA 257 (2000) (Leb.) (compiled by around 400 scholars under the 
supervision of Shaykh Ni m Burh np r  and known as FAT W ‘ LAMG R  in the Indian Subconti-
nent, after the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir (d. 1118/1707), who commissioned its compila-
tion).
 48.  In the words of al-Margh n n  and Zayn al-D n (or Zayn al-‘ bid n) Ibn Ibr h m Ibn Mu-
hammad Ibn Nujaym: “li-anna al-qa ’a ya‘tamidu al-wil ya”; 2 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 
153; 5 IBN NUJAYM, AL-BA R AL-R ’IQ SHAR KANZ AL-DAQ ’IQ 168 (1998) (India). Fakhr al-D n
al-Zayla‘  states “anna al-qa ’a yastad‘  al-wil ya wa ya‘tamidu-h .” 4 AL-ZAYLA‘ , TABY N AL-
AQ ’IQ SHAR KANZ AL-DAQ ’IQ 135 (2000) (Leb.). Badr al-D n al-‘Ayn  states: “l  qa ’a bi-d n
al-wil ya.” 7 AL-‘AYN , AL-BIN YA SHAR  AL-HID YA 204 (2000) (Leb.). Similar wording used is “l
wil yata la-n  ‘al  ahl al- arb.”
 49.  2 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 153; 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48; 4 AL-
ZAYLA‘ , supra note 48; 6 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47, at 276. 
 50.  4 AL-ZAYLA‘ , supra note 48; 6 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47. If there is a peace treaty with a 
particular non-Muslim land then it is possible for some form of discretionary punishment (ta’z r) to be 
carried if the specifics of the treaty lay this out.  
 51.  7 AL-‘AYN , supra note 48, at 203–04; 2 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 153; 4 AL-
ZAYLA‘ , supra note 48, at 135–36; 6 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47; 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48. 
 52.  7 AL-‘AYN , supra note 48, at 204 (al-‘Ayn  mentions that mustaqbal is in opposition to 
actions committed in D r al-Isl m); 6 AL- ASKAF , DURR AL-MUKHT R SHAR TANW R AL-AB R
277; 2 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 153; 6 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47. 
 53.  6 KAM L AL-D N MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HUM M, FAT  AL-QAD R SHAR  AL-HID YA 17–18
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to the aforementioned reason of committing to Islamic rulings in the fu-
ture (iltazama a k m al-isl m f ’l-mustaqbal).54 The issue is somewhat 
different if both parties are non-Muslims but convert to Islam and enter 
D r al-Isl m; in that case, the judge will decree that the property owed 
must be returned. Here, the jurists look at the concept of iltiz m (commit-
ment) again, and hold that in this case the occurrence of the debt is valid 
jurisdictionally as the act took place with the agreement of both parties 
accepting and submitting to the laws of Islam. Hence, the jurisdiction re-
quired for the q to adjudicate is established at the time of pronouncing 
the decree as both had committed (iltiz m) themselves to the laws of Is-
lam.55
Along with misappropriated property, the issue of murder is also men-
tioned in the interlocution with Ab an fa cited earlier. Expounding on 
this, the jurists give the following details: if a Muslim musta’min (in non-
Muslim territory) takes the life of another Muslim musta’min, whether it is 
by murder (‘amadan) or by manslaughter (kha a’an), in both cases it would 
be obligatory to pay the blood money (d ya) from his personal wealth. In 
the case of manslaughter, an expiatory act (kaff ra) is also required. The 
sentence is different from what one could face in D r al-Isl m, wherein, 
retaliatory slaughter (qawd/qi ) can be applied for murder. For man-
slaughter, blood money must be paid by the tribal group (‘ qila,).56 This is
because, in D r al-Isl m, the family/tribal group is held partly responsible 
for the crime, as they are required to know the perpetrator’s whereabouts 
and restrain him from committing such an act. With a change in territory 
(tab yun al-darayan), however, the tribal group cannot be held responsible 
for a crime that a member committed in another land.57
 54.  The same applies if a Muslim embezzles the property of a non-Muslim who then coverts to 
Islam and files a case in D r al-Isl m; i.e. a fatwa will be issued but not a court decree. 
 55.  2 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 153; 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 169; 4 AL-
ZAYLA‘ , supra note 48, at 136–37; 6 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47. There are some further details on the 
issue of embezzled property (gha ab) but it is not necessary to provide them all here. One can compare 
these notions with the “submission rule”, “choice of jurisdiction rule” and “special jurisdiction rules” of 
the European Union Brussels Regulation. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5(1), 5(3), 23–24 2000 O.J. 
(L 12) 1 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:en:PDF. See also 
Mark Rosen, Choice of Law as Non Constitutional Federal Law, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 56.  ‘ qila refers to the male relatives of the perpetrator responsible for paying the bloodwite. For 
the anaf s, it includes soldiers of the same regiment or traders of the same market (or wherever else 
solidarity can be established). See Kit b al-Jin y t in the sources supra note 55. For a general account 
of Islamic criminal law and its application in different contexts see RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2005). 
 57. 2 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 153; 6 IBN AL-HUM M, supra note 53, at 19–20; 7 AL-
‘AYN , supra note 48, at 205; 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 169; 4 AL-ZAYLA‘ , supra note 48, at 
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anaf s do not, however, excuse the expiatory act because the 
Qur’anic verse pertaining to manslaughter (which states “[w]hoever kills 
another believer must free a believing slave”)58 is without restriction 
(mu laq). Hence, the ruling of expiation would apply irrespective of loca-
tion whether it is D r al-Isl m or D r al- arb. As for the blood money, 
the jurists assert that a Muslim maintains the protection and inviolability of 
his life if he enters non-Muslim territory with a security covenant, because 
the inviolability here (even if to a lesser extent) is established from the 
protection of D r al-Isl m (li-anna al-‘i mata al-th bita bi’l-i r z bi-d r
al-isl m). Retaliatory slaughter, however, is impossible to execute unless 
the state has the power to do so. This can only exist with a Muslim sover-
eign (imam/caliph) in place who rules over Muslim subjects. Because this 
is not the case with D r al- arb (non-Muslim land), the ruling of retaliato-
ry slaughter cannot be applied.59 Some of the jurists emphasize the point of 
jurisdiction again, paralleling this to the fact that add punishments60 are 
nullified in the case of adultery and theft in the absence of Muslim sover-
eignty.61
If the case involves two Muslim prisoners in D r al- arb, and one 
takes the life of the other, or if a Muslim trader (i.e. with a security cove-
nant) takes the life of a Muslim prisoner, then the murderer will not be 
punished except that an expiatory act would be required in the case of man-
slaughter. The same ruling is given if a Muslim kills another Muslim who 
converted to Islam in non-Muslim territory.62
In the above cases, the emphasis that the anaf  School places on ter-
ritory and jurisdiction is readily observable. An important concept of the 
inviolability (‘i ma) of life and property is highlighted in the juristic dis-
cussion of Islam in non-Muslim territory. The other schools and also Ab
Y suf (d. 182/798, who is one of Ab an fa’s two most prominent stu-
dents), while not entirely rejecting territorial jurisdiction and inviolability, 
give far less significance to its effect in non-Muslim lands. They argue that 
 58.  Qur’an, 4:92. 
 59. See supra note 57. 
 60.  add, pl. ud d (lit. “limits”) are the restrictive ordinances or statutes of God that have fixed 
punishments in the Shari‘a. They are illicit intercourse (punishable by death by stoning or one hundred 
lashes), making an unproven accusation of intercourse/defamation (eighty lashes), drinking wine (forty 
or eighty lashes), theft (amputation of the hand/limbs), highway robbery (death by crucifixion or sword 
if it includes murder, otherwise the same punishment as theft applies). Each has very a specific defini-
tion that determines whether a crime constitutes a add and there are strict evidentiary requirements 
also. See PETERS, supra note 56, at 53–64. 
 61.  6 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47. 
 62. 7 AL-‘AYN , supra note 48, at 206; 2 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 153; 1 AL-NASAF ,
supra note 47, at 595; 4 AL-ZAYLA‘ , supra note 48, at 138–39; 6 IBN AL-HUM M, supra note 53, at 20; 
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the laws of God and His Messenger apply to Muslims in absolute terms, 
irrespective of place (d r/mak n) and time.63 In the aforementioned case, 
where the Muslim with a security covenant kills another Muslim with the 
same territorial status, those schools state that retaliatory slaughter is oblig-
atory in the case of murder (‘amad). Al-Sh fi‘ , for example, maintained 
that there should be no distinction between the punishment for a Muslim 
killed in Muslim territory or non-Muslim territory.64 The anaf s, however, 
state that inviolability stems from territory, not from religion (al-i r z bi’l-
d r l  bi’l-d n). They do, nevertheless, split the inviolability into two cate-
gories: (i) al-‘i ma al-muqawwima, which is tied to territory; and (ii) al-
‘i ma al-mu’aththima, which is tied to religion.65 So, when Ab an fa
states that there is nothing due on a Muslim trader that kills a prisoner or a 
Muslim convert, it is because the inviolability of life and property that was 
previously available to him in D r al-Isl m has been waived upon entering 
non-Muslim territory. However, the religious inviolability is not waived as 
long as he is a Muslim, meaning that the sin (ithm) remains for committing 
the crime and contravening the covenant of security, even though the Is-
lamic punishment does not (muqawwima).66 Thus, the anaf s differentiate 
between legal obligation that is connected with D r al-Isl m and moral 
obligation that is connected with Islam. 
The above discussion on the jurisdiction of D r al-Isl m demonstrates 
the complexity involved if someone violates the security covenant. One 
matter of particular importance understood from the above juristic dis-
course is that Muslim jurists envisaged Muslims sojourning to non-Islamic 
territory for temporary periods only. When looking at the case of a Muslim 
with a security covenant who murders another Muslim with a security cov-
enant, a reason for maintaining the penalty of blood money is because the 
jurists treated his visit to non-Muslim lands as temporary, with the idea that 
he would return back to his homeland in the not-too-distant future. This can 
be discerned from al-Margh n n ’s use of the word “‘ ri ,” (contingency) 
indicating a temporary cause for visiting non-Muslim territory.67 This 
 63.  For al-Sh fi‘ s view, see 7 AL-SH FI‘ , supra note 24, at 354–55. For the view of M lik, see 
16 SA N N, supra note 31, at 91. For the anbal  position, see IBN QUD MA, supra note 30, at 218, 
473–74. All three discuss the application of Islamic punishments ( ud d and qi s) for infractions of 
criminal law. Note that the the schools differ on whether (and which) punishments can be applied if the 
imam or army chief (vested with authority) is present among an army in a non-Muslim land.  
 64.  6 ‘Al ’ AL-D N AB BAKR AL-K S N , BAD ’I‘ AL-SAN ’I‘ F TART B AL-SHAR ’I‘ 69
(1998) (India). 
 65.  AL-SARAKHS , supra note 13, at 62; 7 AL-‘AYN , supra note 48, at 205; 4 AL-ZAYLA‘ , supra
note 48, at 138–39; 6 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47, at 278. 
 66.  Id.
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would also explain why they often addressed Muslims in D r al- arb as 
traders. Hence, some jurists mentioned that since there is an intention of 
returning to D r al-Isl m, it is supposed (taqd ran) that he was in Dar al-
Islam because that is his permanent residence. D r al-Isl m is then able to 
fulfill some of its obligations to the murdered person.68 The jurists did not 
discuss the case of a Muslim who does not enter non-Muslim territory for 
temporary purposes, but is rather a permanent resident in non-Muslim 
lands.69 One can only presume that because he has no legal connection with 
D r al-Isl m, the Islamic state would not be able to apply any of its rulings 
for crimes committed outside of D r al-Isl m,70 as the protection it offers 
to the life and property of Muslims would not exist. 
IV. INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC JURISDICTION IN NON-MUSLIM LANDS 
AND APPOINTING JUDGES
Many of these principles form the basis for spreading rulings across 
other sections of Islamic jurisprudence outside the section on siyar and 
jihad. In financial law, for example, the anaf s—who are the specific 
focus of this section—hold that transactions that are otherwise prohibited 
(al-‘uq d al-f sida) in D r al-Isl m become permissible in D r al- arb. In 
standard anaf  texts, one can find a ruling (based on a prophetic tradition) 
which states, “There is no usury between a Muslim and a non-Muslim in 
D r al- arb.” This is because a Muslim sovereign cannot extend extra-
territorial protection to those living outside D r al-Isl m; hence, their prop-
erty is violable and unprotected (mub and ghayr ma f ).71
In the section on judiciary in Islamic jurisprudence (Kit b al-
Qa ’/Adab al-Q ), Muslim scholars have also discussed independent 
jurisdiction within non-Muslim territory. That is, Muslim scholars have 
also elaborated on how jurisdiction is established and forms within non-
Muslim lands (rather than the extension of D r al-Isl m’s jurisdiction in 
D r al- arb, which was described in the previous section). For example, 
anaf  jurists addressed the question of appointing Muslim judges in non-
Muslim lands and the judicial authority that would be vested in them. A 
dictate from a standard anaf  manual of jurisprudence (matn) states that 
 68.  7 AL-‘AYN , supra note 48, at 205. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Apart from the Muslim having to offer an expiatory act, as this is not dependent on territory 
but rather an absolute verse of the Qur’an as mentioned earlier, the same expiatory is required for 
intentional breaking of the fast, breaking an oath, etc., irrespective of territory.  
 71.  See, e.g., 3 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 66. For an analysis in English, see also 
Mustafa R. K. Baig, A Fatwa on Usury in the Context of British Society (2005) (unpublished M.A. 
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“[i]t is permissible to accept the position of qa ’ from a just or tyrannical 
ruler.”72 From this short statement, a discussion among jurists emerges with 
respect to a particular part of this legal rule. The characteristics of a just 
(‘ dil) ruler were quite straightforward, but the definition of a tyrant, or 
“j ’ir,” was more complex. 
The permissibility of a tyrannical ruler to appoint judges is first exem-
plified by citing a precedent of the sultanate of Mu‘ w ya Ibn Ab  Sufy n
(d. 60/680) over parts of the Islamic empire.73 In it, the Companions 
( a ba) of the Prophet and their successors (t bi‘ n) accepted judicial 
positions during his tyrannical reign, to go along with the early generations 
of Muslims accepting such posts in the reign of al- ajj j Ibn Y suf (d. 
95/714).74 A very interesting dimension is added by some jurists in their 
exploration of the term j ’ir. ‘Al ’ al-D n al- askaf  (d. 1088/1677), citing 
earlier scholars such as Misk n (d. 907/1501-2), states that the term can 
also be extended to a non-Muslim.75 Looking at Misk n’s original passage, 
he takes a linguistic view of the term, in that it refers to a tyrant in the “ab-
solute sense” ( lim mu laqan) regardless of whether the tyrant is a Mus-
lim or a non-Muslim. Misk n attributes his position back to the Kit b al-A l
of Muhammad al-Shayb n .76 In explaining Misk n’s view, Ab  al-Su‘ d
 72.  “Yaj zu taqallud al-qa ’ min al-sul n al-‘ dil wa’l-j ’ir.” 2 AL-NASAF , KANZ AL-
DAQ ’IQ, supra note 47, at 110; 8 AL-TAMART SH , supra note 47, at 43.
 73.  The unjust part of Mu‘ w ya Ibn Ab  Sufy n’s rule that is being referred to is when he set 
himself up as a rebellious leader in opposition to the righteous/rightful caliph of the time, ‘Al  Ibn Ab
lib (the fourth legitmate “Rightly-Guided Caliph”; d. 40/661). During that period there were Com-
panions of the Prophet that accepted judicial office. Later, asan Ibn ‘Al  (d. 50/670)—after succeeding 
his father as the fifth Rightly-Guided Caliph of Islam—relinquished power to Mu‘ w ya in 41/661 after 
a peace treaty was forged between the two parties, and his leadership thereafter is considered legitimate 
(and not a rebellion). 
 74.  Al- ajj j Ibn Y suf was a powerful Umayyad administrator (governing over large parts of 
the Umayyad empire) infamous for his brutality and oppression. The wisdom behind this ruling is that 
even if the rulers are unjust, then judges could at least dispense justice in society in their own capacities. 
The condition that a judge is able to perform his duties with justice is attached to the permissibility of 
accepting such positions. 3 AL-MARGH N N , supra note 16, at 102; 8 AL- ASKAF , supra note 47, at 
44. 
 75.  8 AL- ASKAF , supra note 47, at 43. 
 76.  3 MU‘ N AL-D N MULL MISK N HARAW FAR H (sometimes known by his pen name 
“Mu‘ n ”), SHAR MULL MISK N ‘AL KANZ AL-DAQ ’IQ 26 (n.d.) (photocopy without publisher 
information, printed with its commentary in 3 AB  AL-SU‘ D SAYYID MUHAMMAD IBN ‘AL  AL-
USAYN , FAT ULL H AL-MU‘ N ‘AL SHAR MULL MISK N (n.d.)). Misk n’s view is also mentioned 
in 6 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 461. Al-Fat w  al-Hind yya cites the view in reference to al-
Multaqa  in 3 AL-FAT W  AL-HIND YA, supra note 47, at 295. A mad Ri  Kh n al-Bar lw  al-Hind
cites both Misk n and al-Multaqa , in 18 A MAD RI KH N AL-BAR LW  AL-HIND , AL-‘A Y  AL-
NABAW YA F ’L-FAT W  AL-RI AW YA 545 (2000) (Pak.). Kit b al-A l (also known as al-Mabs ) is 
among the six authoritative texts compiled by Muhammad al-Shayb n  in which (mainly) the opinions 
of Ab an fa, Ab  Y suf and his own are narrated. The texts belong to the classification of hir al-
riw y t and form the structural authority of the anaf  School, as the narrations have been reliably 
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(who wrote a commentary on Misk n’s work), states that this notion deems 
valid the sultanate of a non-Muslim over Muslims and establishes the valid-
ity of such a ruler to appoint a person to the judiciary. According to this 
view, Islam is not a condition to establish rule; since it is valid for a non-
Muslim to appoint judges, it is also valid for a non-Muslim to remove 
them.77
Another text, al-Fat w  al-T t rkh n ya, also mentions that Islam is 
not a condition for the sovereign to appoint judges and adds some interest-
ing points relating to Muslim sovereignty, governance, and judiciary. It 
mentions that when lands come into the possession of non-Muslims, but the 
judicial affairs remain with the Muslims, such countries will still be classed 
as Islamic lands (bil d al-isl m) because the judges are Muslim and non-
Islamic (kufr) laws are not prevalent there.78 The underlying notion is that 
the lands are only occupied by non-Muslims for a temporary period, and 
there is an expectation that sovereignty will return to the Muslims. The 
Fat w  adds a general point about Muslim rulers that are subservient to 
non-Muslims; it states that those that are subservient out of compulsion are 
still Muslims, but those that are without compulsion will be considered 
transgressors.79
Next, there is mention of cities that have Muslim governors appointed 
by non-Muslims. The Fat w  states that, because of the jurisdiction that 
they hold there, it is permissible for those judges to perform the Friday and 
‘ d congregational prayers as well as to collect land taxes (khar j), appoint 
judges, and marry off orphans.80 This ruling is significant because these 
acts must be undertaken by the Muslim sovereign/authority. It is normally 
among the conditions of the Friday and ‘ d prayers, for example, that the 
prayers must be led by the sovereign (imam/caliph), or by one of his ap-
pointees/governors (w l ). In the ruling above, even though the gover-
nors/officials are not appointed by a Muslim sovereign, but are appointed 
by a non-Muslim, they are permitted to administer the Friday and ‘ d pray-
ers. 
contradict the hir al-riw y t are thus dismissed. The other five works are: al-J mi‘ al-Kab r, al-J mi‘ 
al- agh r, al-Siyar al-Kab r, al-Siyar al- agh r and al-Ziy d t.
 77.  3 AB  AL-SU‘ D, supra note 76, at 26. 
 78.  Al-Fat w  al-T t rkh n ya, authored primarily by ‘ lim Ibn al-‘Ul ’ al-Andr t  al-Dehlaw
(d. 786/1384) and about 30 other authors, in 8 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47, at 43; 18 A MAD RI
KH N, supra note 76, at 546–47. My personal copy of al-Fat w  al-T t rkh n ya (published in Kara-
chi) is incomplete from which the chapter concerning judges (Kit b Adab al-Q ) is missing. I have 
also checked a copy from another publisher (Beirut) and the same section is missing. 
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In case one wonders whether the jurists only discussed those territo-
ries that are in some way occupied or dominated by non-Muslims or 
whether they discussed such lands that were essentially non-Muslim with-
out some form of political involvement or engagement between the Muslim 
and non-Muslim polities, an answer seems to appear in the following pas-
sage from al-Fat w  al-T t rkh n ya, which states:  
As for those lands where non-Muslims rule, the Muslims are permitted to 
undertake the performance of Friday and ‘ d [prayers] and judges will be 
[recognized as official] judges with the [collective] agreement of the 
Muslims. It is necessary for the Muslims to request a Muslim governor 
from the non-Muslim rulers.81
The distinct feature of the above is that it refers to lands where com-
plete authority and control lies with non-Muslims, whether such lands were 
previously Muslim, or if they were lands always under non-Muslim rule. 
Although the text consists only of a few lines, it contains matters of im-
portance for Muslims living in non-Muslim countries today in that it pro-
vides a basis for performing the Jumu‘a and ‘ d prayers as well as 
managing other affairs through the appointment of judges. One may as-
sume that the above passage does not specifically state that the following 
refers to countries that have permanently and entirely remained under non-
Muslim rule, but because this new subject item mentions countries under 
non-Muslim rule without any other condition, one could be assured that it 
is inclusive of non-Muslim countries (such as the United States) if one 
wishes to apply the ruling in that way. What is being said is that Muslims 
should appoint their own authority, who is then the locum tenens of a judge 
or Islamic sovereign ( kim shar‘ ).
A. Ibn al-Hum m on Appointing Judges 
The renowned anaf  jurist Ibn al-Hum m comments on the ruling in 
Hid ya, and found in the works of other jurists, that it is only permissible 
to accept judgeships from a tyrannical ruler when one knows that the duty 
 81.  Id. In Ibn ‘ bid n’s citation of al-Fat w  al-T t rkh n ya, he states at the end of the quote 
that Misk n has attributed the above to al-A l (of Muhammad al-Shayb n ), although I have shown that 
here Misk n’s discussion is limited to the definition of j ’ir and that it includes non-Muslims (this shall 
be discussed in more detail later). He also says this is similar to what is mentioned in J mi‘ al-
Fu layn. See BADR AL-D N MA M D IBN ISR ‘ L AL-SHAH R BI-IBN Q SAM WUNA, J MI‘ AL-
FU LAYN 11 (1882) (Egypt). The original text is indeed similar to al-Fat w  al-T t rkh n ya with the 
exception of the first two points—that Islam is not a condition for the sultanate and the question of 
lands being occupied by non-Muslims. It would be interesting to discover whether the views found in 
J mi‘ al-Fu layn and al-Fat w  al-T t rkh n ya were generated from within the legal-literary tradi-
tion or whether the special situation of fourteen and fifteenth century Ottoman Turkey (in the case of 
Badr al-D n Sam wuna) and thirteen and fourteenth century India (in the case of al-Fat w  al-





      01/14/2015   15:25:42
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 57 Side B      01/14/2015   15:25:42
P04 - BAIG (WITH SIGNIFICANT CHANGES)(4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2015 9:32 AM
100 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
could be carried out rightfully and fairly.82 He discusses a situation where 
there is neither a sultan, nor anyone who is permitted to appoint judges, 
pointing out that this is currently the situation found in some Muslim coun-
tries (in his time) where non-Muslims have taken control, “such as Cordoba 
today and Valenica in the Maghreb, and Abyssinia.”83 In such circumstanc-
es, they should appoint Muslims from among themselves to collect taxes, 
and they are required to agree on a person whom they will make a governor 
(w l ); then the governor shall appoint a judge who shall adjudicate among 
them. Similarly, they should appoint an imam who shall lead the Friday 
prayer.84
Before discussing the above, it is useful to summarize the above texts 
and make clear the various scenarios that the jurists have discussed. Thus, 
in light of the juristic discourse, one can identify three categories of places 
with respect to the appointment of judges: (1) those countries where the 
sovereign is Muslim but the Muslim government is under the authority of 
non-Muslims; (2) those places that attain independent judicial authority but 
the sovereign is non-Muslim (and the sovereign has appointed Muslim 
governors); and (3) those lands that are ruled entirely by non-Muslims; the 
sovereign and all other administrative positions are held by non-Muslims.85
Returning to the ruling of Ibn al-Hum m from the three categories 
mentioned above, he is describing the third category. This is comparable to 
the last part of the T t rkh n ya text. For purposes of clarity, both state-
ments cited earlier are juxtaposed here: “As for those countries where non-
Muslims rule . . .” (al-Fat w  al-T t rkh n ya) and “[w]here there is no 
sultan, nor one for whom it is permitted to appoint judges . . .” (Ibn al-
Hum m, Fat  al-Qad r).
The text of T t rkh n ya left the statement open, but Ibn al-Hum m, 
after stating the general point about lands where no sultan exists, exempli-
fies the matter in reference to lands that have been taken over by non-
Muslims (such as Cordoba). He does not specifically refer to lands that 
have always been non-Muslim, probably because classical jurists did not 
 82.  See supra note 74. 
 83.  7 IBN AL-HUM M, supra note 53, at 246. His view is also cited in 6 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 
48, at 461, and slightly summarized in 8 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47, at 43–44. 
 84.  Id.
 85.  I have adopted the categories from Im m A mad Ri  Kh n al-Bar lw  with slight variations 
in order to keep the discussion more coherent. See 18 A MAD RI KH N, supra note 76, at 547. 
A mad Ri  Kh n gives the corresponding Arabic words from the text to point out where each block of 
text from the legal sources starts and ends to denote each category. I should mention here that A mad 
Ri  Kh n’s fatwa, which is essentially a monograph on the appointment of judges in British India, 
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envisage Muslims to be residing in such lands. Thus, Ibn al-Hum m gave 
the example of a practical problem affecting the Muslims at that time. 
Both parts of the text discuss the same issue. Nevertheless, Ibn al-
Hum m’s passage is sometimes presented by jurists after the citation of 
T t rkh n ya as a statement in opposition to the former, although, Ibn al-
Hum m himself does not explicitly rebut the views of any earlier jurists. 
The point of difference between the jurists lies in who is eligible to appoint 
judges. One of the last major authorities of the school, Ibn ‘ bid n (d. 
1252/1836), quotes Sir j al-D n Ibn Nujaym’s (d. 1005/1596) al-Nahr al-
F ‘iq86 as saying that the position of Ibn al-Hum m is “satisfying and 
should be depended on.”87 Ibn ‘ bid n states that this is referring to Ibn al-
Hum m’s position regarding the invalidity of non-Muslims appointing 
judges (‘adam si at taqallud al-qa ’ min k fir), which is contrary to 
what has been mentioned in T t rkh n ya.88 The disagreement is that a 
non-Muslim authority cannot appoint judges; it is only this element of 
T t rkh n ya that is disagreed upon. In a similar fashion, the elder Ibn 
Nujaym (Zayn al-D n) cites Misk n’s view (which is the same view held in 
T t rkh n ya) regarding the permissibility of accepting judgeships from 
non-Muslim rulers. After making clear that Ibn al-Hum m opposed this, he 
states that the view of Ibn al-Hum m is corroborated by the text of J mi‘ 
al-Fu layn (which does not mention that it is permissible to accept judi-
cial positions from non-Muslims).89
As noted earlier, Misk n referenced his view to al-A l (also called al-
Mabs ) of Muhammad al-Shayb n . As such, this position is attributed to 
the most authoritative works of the anaf  School. In later years, the Indian 
jurisprudent, A mad Ri  Kh n al-Bar lw  (d. 1340/1921), investigated the 
matter further. He traced the original text of al-A l, finding that the quote is 
cited in the chapter of prayer (Kit b al- al h) in Radd al-Mu t r (with
reference to another text, Mi‘r j al-Dir ya).90 Interestingly, A mad Ri
Kh n finds that there is no mention of what Misk n has ascribed to it. The 
 86.  See SIR J AL-D N ‘UMAR IBN IBR H M IBN NUJAYM, AL-NAHR AL-F ‘IQ HAR KANZ AL-
DAQ ’IQ (2002) (Leb.) (Not to be confused with his elder brother, Zayn al-D n Ibn Nujaym, author of 
al-Ba r al-R ’iq, who died in 970/1563, supra note 48). 
 87.  Jurists use the term mu‘tamad ‘alay-hi to signify the opinion (from among other opinions) 
which the school depends upon. 
 88.  8 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47, at 44. 
 89.  6 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 461; J MI‘ AL-FU LAYN in 18 A MAD RI KH N, supra 
note 76, at 542. 
 90.  18 A MAD RI KH N, supra note 76, at 545–46. I was not able to find the quote in al-A l in 
the edition published by D ’ir t al-Ma‘ rif, Hyderabad in 1966, edited by Ab ’l-Waf  al-Afgh n ;
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text is very similar to what is found in T t rkh n ya, except for the opening 
line, which states that Islam is not a condition for the sultanate. The only 
significant point it adds is that, for those lands where governors have been 
appointed by a non-Muslim sovereign (the second category mentioned 
earlier), Islamic penal laws ( ud d) can also be implemented there as well 
as the Friday and ‘ d prayers. Again, this is because of the administrative 
power and jurisdiction that Muslims possess there.91 If the findings of 
A mad Ri  Kh n are to be accepted by all subsequent jurists then not only 
should Ibn al-Hum m’s opinion be depended upon, as mentioned by Ibn 
‘ bid n, but rather it will become the authoritative or official ruling of the 
school. 
It is necessary to unpack the various layers of textual discussion here 
because of the implications it might have on modern juristic discourse in 
countries like the United States. If the view of T t rkh n ya and Misk n is 
adopted, then it would be legally possible (from a shar‘ point of view) for 
U.S. governments to appoint Islamic judges in America. The majority of 
jurists, however, rule that it is not possible, and that judges shall only be 
appointed by the choice and agreement of the Muslims. Nevertheless, Ibn 
‘ bid n adds an interesting point: if a non-Muslim sovereign designates a 
judge over them and the Muslims accept it, then such an appointment is 
undoubtedly valid.92
Therefore, in a modern United States or Western context, and in the 
discussion regarding the implementation of certain elements of Islamic law 
and incorporating them into the legal system, two options are available for 
discussion from an Islamic ( anaf ) juristic point of view. The Muslims 
either nominate a person to adjudicate among them or the government pro-
poses a person who is appointed on the condition that the Muslims are sat-
isfied with such a person’s appointment to office.
B. Where it is not Possible to Officially Appoint a Governor or Judge 
The above scenarios are not ones that are found in the United States or 
elsewhere, such as in Europe. Presently, there are no Islamic judges in offi-
cial judicial positions,93 nor is there any concept of a Muslim governor who 
would appoint a judge over the Muslims. Late anaf  jurists have discussed 
this situation and suggest that Muslims should appoint a scholar competent 
 91.  See 8 IBN ‘ BID N, supra note 47, at 43. 
 92.  Id. at 44. 
 93.  By Islamic judges, I am referring to judges that apply Shari‘a rulings and not judges that are 
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in Islamic jurisprudence, who is upright and of the correct Sunni faith, as a 
sort of de facto judge.94 In fact, ‘Abd al-Ghan  al-N bulus  (d.  1143/1731), 
refers back to a sixth/twelfth century legist who covered the subject conclu-
sively: 
When the era is void of an appropriate sultan [to administer the affairs of 
his Muslim subjects], then the ‘ulam ’ (scholars) will be empowered [to 
administer their affairs] and it is necessary upon the umma (Muslim 
community) to take recourse to these scholars. The scholars will become 
governors. If it is difficult for all of them to take recourse to one scholar 
then each region should independently adhere to their [local] scholars. If 
there are many [scholars in one area] then the most knowledgeable 
among them should be followed. If they are all equal [in knowledge] 
then [one should be selected] by casting lots among them.95
The issue in this case is comparatively straightforward, and no differ-
ence of opinion within the school has been cited here. In fact, a similar 
concept can be found among the other schools so it is not restricted to 
anaf  legal thinking.96 It delegates the legal affairs of Muslims to compe-
tent Muslim scholars in society. Although the above passage does not de-
fine the scope of which areas of Shari‘a are to be administered by scholars, 
later anaf  scholars (such as A mad Ri  Kh n writing in British India) 
have outlined a practical set of areas that should be governed by Muslim 
 94.  18 A MAD RI KH N, supra note 76, at 549. I have obtained an unpublished fatwa from the 
late anaf  Mufti Ghulam Rasool who lived in London (on file with author). He similarly states that in 
those places where there is no Islamic sovereign, reliable and trustworthy scholars are representative or 
the locum tenens of an Islamic sovereign. 
 95.  1 SAYYID ‘ABD AL-GHAN IBN ISM ‘ L AL-N BULUS , AL- AD QA AL-NAD YA SHAR  AL-
AR QA AL-MU AMMAD YA 351 (1994) (Turkey). His reference is to al-‘A bi, that is Ab  Na r
A mad Ibn Muhammad al-‘A b  al-Bukh r  (d. 586/1190). Although the passage does not specify 
non-Muslim lands and may well have been written in the context of Muslim lands without appropriate 
rulers, the fact that the statement is general (“when the era is void”) has allowed the contemporary 
mufti mentioned above (Ghulam Rasool) to cite the passage in his fatwa addressing Muslims in Britain, 
and A mad Ri  Kh n to cite it in the context of British India (18 A MAD RI KH N, supra note 77, 
at 549-50). Couple this with rulings cited above that non-Muslims can appoint judges. 
 96.  Al-Juwayn  (d. 478/1085 writing a century before al-‘Att b ), for example, states something 
similar to the above passage from al-N bulus . IM M L- ARAMAYN AB  AL-MA‘ L ‘ABD AL-MALIK 
AL-JUWAYN , GHIY TH AL-UMAM F ILTIY TH AL- ULAM 280–83 (1979) (Egypt). Although he belongs 
to the Sh fi‘  School, Ghiy th al-Umam (also known as al-Ghiy th ) is a work of the Islamic govern-
ance genre (al-siy sa al-shari‘ ya/al-fikr (al-fiqh) al-siy s  al-isl m ) akin to the contemporaneous al-
A k m al-Sul n ya of al-M ward , supra note 42, and the book of the same name (and time) by al-Q i
Ab  Ya‘l  (Muhamad Ibn al- usayn Ibn al-Farr ’, d. 458/1066). The contents of the book tend to 
accord with the consensus of the schools, indicating that there is convergence of the schools on this 
particular issue. Al-N bulus  himself in fact cites the Sh fi‘  scholar N r al-D n Ab  al- asan ‘Al  al-
Samh d  (d. 911 /1506), who says that this specific type of power (al-wil y  al-kh a) vested in these 
scholars does not negate the general obligation to follow other Muslims scholars (mu laqan) not vested 
with such powers (this work by al-N bulus  is also not restricted to the anaf  School; in fact, it would 
not be considered a legal work as such because it engages with the full breath of Islamic disciplines to 
provide “religious guidance” to believers). IBN ISM ‘ L AL-N BULUS , supra note 95, at 351–52. The 
scriptural basis for this obedience to scholars would stem from the Qur’anic verse (4:59): “O you who 
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scholars, which would normally come under the judicial remit of an offi-
cially appointed judge. These areas of the law include leading the Friday 
and ‘ d prayers, sighting of the new moon (establishing the new months), 
dissolving marriages (faskh al-nik ), marrying orphans and others unable 
to marry independently, and other areas of Islamic law that are not at con-
flict with, or do not face any hindrance from, the laws of the land.97
V. EVALUATING THE ISLAMIC DISCOURSE OF MUSLIMS IN               
NON-MUSLIM LANDS
At the outset, it was noted that the Qur’an discusses emigration, and 
that it is a very important part of the religious history of the early commu-
nity (and for Muslims in other instances of history). The earliest Muslim 
scholars addressed the social and commercial phenomenon of Muslims 
traveling outside D r al-Isl m and coming under non-Muslim rule. Alt-
hough these Muslims were discussed in the context of traders, the legal 
matters discussed with respect to those traders were not limited only to 
financial transactions, but they also covered penal law and other matters. 
Islamic jurists expressed a variety of attitudes toward Muslims living under 
non-Muslim rule. While these opinions were largely informed by the posi-
tions of their school (madhhab), the political and social circumstances 
sometimes contributed to the cementing of these positions.98
A study of the section on siyar/jihad reveals that it is not a body of lit-
erature solely concerned with hostile relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims. Instead, its nature is multifaceted: not only do the jurists discuss 
matters that regulate military warfare, but, in the same section, they also 
discuss matters relating to peaceful abidance in non-Muslim territory. Thus, 
just as Islamic law contemplates entry into non-Muslim lands through war-
fare, Islamic law clearly makes space for peaceful relations in non-Muslim 
lands. In American public discourse, some use jihad as a catchall phrase to 
encapsulate all of Shari‘a, which is clearly misguided. But, even in this 
single element of the Shari‘a, misconstrued notions of jihad continue to 
perpetuate. The fact that this guidance is in the section on jihad calls for a 
more panoptic understanding of what the section comprises. Because of 
issues arising from the wider context of jihad, discussions centered on jihad 
have a wider rubric than are often assumed. 
 97.  18 A MAD RI KH N, supra note 76, at 549. Also see, Mufti Ghulam Rasool’s fatwa 
mentioned above. A mad Ri  Kh n is writing in the context of British India while Mufti Ghulam 
Rasool’s fatwa was penned in present day London.  
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Although legal manuals were predominantly designed to address Mus-
lims living in D r al-Isl m, classical Islamic jurists also codified complex 
and profound legal rulings pertaining to Muslims in non-Muslim lands. In 
particular, one is able to discern the practical concerns of anaf  jurists in 
extending the jurisdiction of Islam to non-Muslim lands. While judges in 
Muslim lands cannot enforce Islamic law for acts committed in non-
Muslim lands because of a lack of jurisdiction (in light of a “territorialist” 
or “anti-extraterritorialism” approach adopted by anaf s), Islamic law 
makes a subtle, yet important, qualification: a Muslim will not be relieved 
from his religious sin or his moral obligations in the event of breaking the 
law. Furthermore, although anaf s stress that inviolability (of life and 
property) stems from territory, and not from religion, D r al-Isl m can still 
exercise some of its judicial authority. However, this is in light of the fact 
that Muslims were only conceived of as temporary sojourners to non-
Muslim lands, and in the case of permanent residency, we can understand 
that there would be no question of applying Islamic law in non-Muslim 
lands.99 Choice-of-law questions were clearly central here to Islamic jurists 
in discussing the extra-territorial jurisdiction of Islam. The division of the 
world into the “Abode of Islam” and “Abode of War” was not to indicate a 
permanent and necessary state of hostility,100 but contained a central con-
cern for the principle of territorial jurisdiction, especially for the anaf s.101
Contrary to the rhetoric found in sections of the media, blogosphere, 
and political sphere, Muslims are not commanded to implement penal law 
in non-Muslim jurisdictions. And contrary to assertions made today by 
certain radical groups claiming to adhere to the Shari‘a, this paper shows 
that Muslims are obliged to observe the local law of the land (which in-
cludes not harming citizens and property). Not only that, but—at least ac-
cording to the anaf  School—in the event of escaping legal justice for 
transgressing the law in a non-Muslim country (or being the victim of an 
offense), they will be deprived of all access or only receive limited access 
to Islamic justice if a case is brought to a Muslim country. All the while, 
Islamic law will continue to hold them responsible from a theological point 
 99.  There are differences among the other schools here, as alluded to earlier. 
 100.  In the way put forward by Bernard Lewis for example. BERNARD LEWIS, THE POLITICAL 
LANGUAGE OF ISLAM 71–80 (1988). 
 101.  In terms of understanding concordance and difference among Islamic legal schools 
(madh hib), one can observe here that on the issue of migration and residence in non-Muslim lands, 
three of the schools hold the same view while the M lik s hold a distinctive one. In terms of extra-
territorial jurisdiction, the position of the anaf  School is unique in contrast to the other three that are 
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of view. According to the other schools, Islamic law will hold them respon-
sible from both a theological and judicial-legal point of view.  
In terms of independent jurisdiction in non-Muslim territories, Muslim 
scholars discussed the different scenarios in which Muslims could find 
themselves. Centuries ago, those jurists laid out the guidance for Muslims 
living in non-Muslim lands, and detailed how they should manage their 
legal affairs. The rulings perhaps go some way to address the M lik  schol-
ars’ concerns that Muslims would be subject to non-Islamic laws. At the 
heart of the jurists’ concern is the need to enunciate how Muslims could 
lead a practicing Muslim life, in all the possible or practical situations that 
they may face. It would not be anachronistic to assert that early Muslim 
jurists provided, not only a blueprint, but in some cases, precise details to 
directly address, in very practical terms, the contentiously debated issue of 
Muslims being able to live by Islamic laws beyond ritual matters. This is 
conceived by vesting authority in personalities that have legal and binding 
power in the absence of an imam (Muslim sovereign) in non-Muslim terri-
tory. With respect to the appointment of judges and administration of Is-
lamic law, the different scenarios addressed by the jurists depended on how 
Muslims were governed. As such, they reflect different considerations that 
result from the realities of the particular Muslim community. The same 
process of determining the practical circumstances of Muslims can be 
adopted for Muslims in the United States today, in terms of defining the 
scope of Islamic jurisprudence that they need to be most immediately con-
cerned with. Traditional jurists did not clearly delineate which areas of the 
law should be administered (except the Friday and ‘ d prayers), leaving it 
open to the Muslims of a particular time and place. 
This perhaps challenges, or provides a new perspective to, the state-
ments made by some writers that voluntary Muslim migration to non-
Muslim lands is a question that never seems to have entered the minds of 
Muslim jurists and theologians.102 While the jurists do not explicitly men-
tion voluntary migration, the fact that they were hardly concerned with the 
means by which these Muslims had arrived in non-Muslim lands (except by 
referring to them as traders or converts in the land), suggests that they may 
have deliberately refrained from this discussion in order not to completely 
restrict this activity. Permanent residency does not seem to be encouraged 
in the early works. However, the detailing of rules governing the appoint-
ment of judges, which can only occur in a permanent and stable setting, 
 102.  See for example, BERNARD LEWIS & BUNTZIE ELLIS CHURCHILL, ISLAM: THE RELIGION AND 
THE PEOPLE 10 (2009). Lewis basically says that Muslims came under non-Muslim rule either by 
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mitigates this. The fact that traditional jurists today do not object to Mus-
lims remaining indefinitely in non-Muslim lands, although much of the 
modern migration was initially for economic reasons as it was in pre-
modern times, also shows there was nothing explicitly prohibitive in the 
sacred texts regarding emigration. This is not to mention that the home 
countries of these immigrants did/do not (always) rule by God’s law.103
VI. ISLAMIC LAW IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Reviewing the different instances where Islamic law, or general Mus-
lim practice, has been considered by American courts, one finds that no 
special exemptions are granted to Muslims that are not granted to others on 
the grounds of religion. Eugene Volokh has (convincingly) argued that 
“[m]any other complaints about incidents of alleged ‘creeping Shari‘a’ in 
American law are misguided, partly because the complaints miss the way 
those incidents simply reflect well-settled (and sound) American law.”104
American law, recognizing an individual’s religious principles, provides 
for freedom of contract and testamentary dispossession of property at 
death. So Muslims, like Christians, Jews and others, can therefore write 
contracts (including marriage) and wills to implement their understanding 
of their religious obligations. Accordingly, Muslims can route their dis-
putes to Muslim tribunals in the way others often route their disputes to 
private arbitrators.105
Likewise, some of the areas where U.S. law has made provisions for 
religious accommodation for Muslims in the workplace include religiously 
mandated dress, such as the headscarf or modest dress, religious holidays 
and objecting to carrying alcohol.106 Such cases are often covered under the 
 103.  Note the famous Hadith narrated on the authority of ‘Umar:  
Actions are only [judged] by intention. And for every person is what he has intended. So 
whosoever migrates for Allah and His Messenger, then his migration is for Allah and His 
Messenger. And whosoever migrates for worldly affair to gain, or for a woman to marry, then 
his migration is for what he has migrated for.  
1 AB ‘ABDULL H MU AMMAD IBN ISM ‘ L AL-BUKH R , AL-J MI‘ AL- AH , 2 (1893-95,
reprint of the Bulaq edition) (Egypt) (Hadith report 1), and five other places in his collection; 6 
AB  AL- USAYN MUSLIM IBN AL- AJJ J, AL-J MI‘ AL-SA H, 48 (1963, reprint of the Istanbul 
edition 1911-1915) (Egypt) (Hadith report 1907); and mentioned in all major collections (with 
slightly different wording). Scholars apply the Hadith unrestrictedly. Sufi travelers to non-Muslim 
lands are also well-documented as well as traders who also served as ambassadors for their faith 
(so improving one’s financial state was embedded within religious intentions for migrating).  
 104.  Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66 OKLA L.
REV. 431, 433 (2014). 
 105.  Id. at 431, 434–35, 437–38. 
 106.  Id. at 441–43. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a federal law but since 1997 (after 
the Supreme Court ruled that it could not be applied to states), 22 states have passed their own RFRAs 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993. There are, of course, constitutional limitations in place that prevent 
the enforcement of contracts or penalties that interfere with compelling 
government or safety interests.107
Government entities also provide religious accommodations that bene-
fit employees, students or customers. Some of these include public school 
holidays on religious occasions in areas where there are many Muslims, 
ablution facilities in universities and airports, provision of halal food in 
government run cafeterias, and government lenders offering loans that for-
mally avoid interest.108 Courts may also deal with issues relating to private 
international law involving companies based in Muslim counties (that ad-
here to certain laws of Islamic commerce) that operate in the United States 
and/or have United States’ employees/partners. Traditional American 
choice-of-law rules apply here as they would for all other interactions with 
foreign laws.109
Abed Awad,110 for example, has handled over 100 cases as an attor-
ney, consultant or expert witness involving components of Shari‘a. They 
include international business contracts where courts deemed that the law 
of a Muslim country applied and enforcing dower payment in an Islamic 
marriage contract. U.S. courts, he notes, also refuse to recognize such or-
ders due to constitutional and due process reasons.111 The American Civil 
Liberties Union has examined similar cases and demonstrably reported that 
“there is no evidence that Islamic law is encroaching on our courts. On the 
 107.  Id. at 435–37, 443–45. 
 108.  These accommodations are not implemented by courts under the above acts but by other 
government agencies on an ad hoc basis relative to the desires of employers, students, customers, etc. 
Id. at 448. 
 109.  See Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA L. REV. 219 (2014). In fact, 
one could say that the value the United States places on the diversity found in its interstate legal sys-
tem—which acts to reflect the distinctive values of citizens in each state—makes it more amenable to 
accommodate foreign law. Particularly considering the fact that choice-of-law was conceptualized as a 
subset of the “general commercial law” of private international law for most of the country’s history. 
Although two Supreme Court rulings (in 1938 and upheld in 1941) declared a federal court sitting in 
diversity should apply the substantive laws of the forum state (lex fori), Mark Rosen has argued that 
choice-of-law must be re-conceptualized as federal law. See Rosen, supra note 55. There is scope here 
to examine how such a framework could be useful for dealing with Islamic law (and foreign laws in 
general), not only because uniformity (of choice-of-law procedures) is necessary to determine predicta-
bility, but it would also reduce political interference. Id. at 61–62 (a point pertinent to the politicized 
nature of debates surrounding Islamic law mentioned above). Incidentally, the defendants in the Okla-
homa case cited above contended that the “[anti-Shari’a law] amendment is merely a choice-of-law 
provision that bans state courts from applying the law of other nations or cultures.” James C. McKinley 
Jr., Judge Blocks Oklahoma’s Ban on Using Shariah Law in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/us/30oklahoma.html.  
 110.  Awad, supra note 3. 
 111.  Id. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, for example, already prevents courts 
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contrary, the court cases cited by anti-Muslim groups as purportedly illus-
trative of this problem actually show the opposite.”112
There is no “special case” for Islam or a change in law that is required. 
Although motivated by their faith, Muslims claimants are simply seeking 
an application of American law, as is the case with people of other faiths, 
such as Jews observing Halakhic law. The same principle is applied for 
cases involving foreign law. The passing of such bills would thus have 
wider ramifications for other U.S. citizens including the Jewish community 
and those involved in international law cases.113
CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that what is required is a common sense 
approach that recognizes the accommodating principles contained within 
the repositories of both the American legal system and the body of Islamic 
law as laid out above. Especially since there are only a very limited number 
of areas where Shari‘a principles may interact with courts in the United 
States in the first place. 
From an Islamic point of view, the ideas discussed here provide a plat-
form for Muslims to both engage with the continuity of the Islamic tradi-
tion, and to apply that tradition to local circumstances. Reductive 
representations or even constructions of the “Shari‘a” in the media and 
in the views of some populist politicians serves to demonstrate that they 
have no grasp of Shari‘a’s potential in this area, not least the unanimity of 
the jurists on living and maintaining a peaceful life under non-Muslim law 
(as necessitated by the am n).
 112.  Nothing to Fear: Debunking the Mythical “Sharia Threat” to Our Judicial System, ACLU 1 
(May 2011), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_Report_FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf. After presenting 
various cases (as Volokh does) to illustrate the point, the report concludes:  
When the court cases cited by anti-Muslim groups are examined more closely, the myth of the 
“Sharia threat” to our judicial system quickly disappears. Far from confirming some fabricat-
ed conspiracy, these cases illustrate that our judicial system is alive and well, and in no dan-
ger of being co-opted or taken over by Islam.  
Id. at 5. 
 113.  To see some of the “unintended consequences” and ramifications of banning Shari‘a in 
courts, as well as the above sources visit: Sheila Musaji, Anti-Sharia Movements’ Unintended Conse-
quences for Jews, Native Americans, and Others, THE AMERICAN MUSLIM (May 16, 2013),
WWW.theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/anti-sharia-movements-unintended-
consquences/0018763; Robert K. Vischer, The Dangers of Anti-Sharia Laws, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 
2012), http://www.firstthings.com/index.php?permalink=article&entry_permalink=2012/03/the-
dangers-of-anti-sharia-laws; Ron Kampeas, Anti-Sharia Laws Stir Concerns That Halachah Could Be 
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Such a study therefore provides valuable information, resources, and 
insights for approaching the contemporary debates surrounding co-
existence and Muslims living in non-Muslim lands such as the United 
States, in which legal affairs continue to feature prominently. This ties into 
the point that Islamic law incorporates the importance of having peaceful 
and pragmatic relationships with non-Muslims in non-Muslim lands, and 
provides the principles to enable such peaceful relations to be maintained 
for the benefit of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 
